Abstract. This paper analyzes blindfolded vs. informed ultimatum bargaining where proposer and responder are both either uninformed or informed about the size of the pie. Considering the transition from one information setting to another suggests that more information induces lower (higher) price offers and acceptance thresholds when the pie is small (large). While our experimental data confirm this transition effect, risk aversion leads to diverging results in blindfolded ultimatum bargaining where task-independent strategies such as 'equal sharing' or the 'golden mean' are implemented more frequently.
INTRODUCTION
In ultimatum bargaining, proposer and responder can share an exogenously given monetary reward, the pie. The proposer makes a 'take it or leave it' offer to the responder who then can accept or reject it. In the latter case, the pie is lost, otherwise it is distributed as proposed. In our setup, the pie is a random surplus from bargaining. Both, the proposer and the responder, are either informed or not informed about this surplus. In the latter case, however, the distribution generating this value is commonly known.
When proposer and responder are both informed about the surplus from trade, they find themselves in the classical ultimatum bargaining situation, as originally analyzed by G€ uth et al. (1982) . While being informed about the surplus from trade might be typical for many bargaining situations (e.g., when selling a well-established firm in a mature industry), this becomes questionable in the case of, e.g., selling a start-up firm in a newly developing industry. In the latter case, neither the potential buyer (proposer) nor the potential seller (responder) will know the surplus from trade with certainty. In our setup, we compare both situations: ultimatum bargaining between parties who both know the value of the surplus from trade ('informed' ultimatum bargaining) and ultimatum bargaining between players when neither party knows that value with certainty ('blindfolded' ultimatum bargaining). In a within-subject design, we do not only compare blindfolded and informed ultimatum bargaining but also consider the effect of a transition from one setting to the other, i.e., we analyze what happens if buyer and seller both become informed about the surplus from trade as, for instance, when an industry matures and information on the value of the traded firm becomes publicly available.
To the best of our knowledge, ultimatum bargaining among mutually uninformed players has not yet been studied. The same is true for the transition effect of becoming informed in ultimatum bargaining between originally uninformed players. So far both, the theoretical and the experimental literature, have concentrated on asymmetric information settings where either the responder or the proposer is not informed about the size of the pie. Chlass (2013) , Croson (1996) , Lee and Lau (2013) , Mitzkewitz and Nagel (1993) , Rapoport and Sundali (1996) and Samuelson and Bazerman (1985) analyze ultimatum bargaining when only the proposer is informed. Likewise, previous experimental work by Ball et al. (1991) , Dittrich et al. (2012) , Foreman and Murnighan (1996) , Grosskopf et al. (2007) , and Harstad and Nagel (2004) focuses on a setting where only the responder is informed. G€ uth et al. (2014) and Klempt et al. (2016) analyze both cases of asymmetric information. Furthermore, G€ uth et al. (2014) study the transition from either case of asymmetric information to one where both players are informed. Contributing to this strand of literature, we assume a setting where both, proposer and responder, are not informed about the size of the pie, i.e., both are 'blindfolded', and analyze the transition to a setting where both are informed.
We proceed as follows: section 2 introduces the theoretical model and derives hypotheses to be tested using experimental data. The experimental design and setup are described in section 3. The main findings are illustrated and statistically analyzed in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
THE THEORETICAL MODEL
The game involves a proposer P, the potential buyer, and a responder R, the potential seller. 1 The proposer valuates the commodity by v 2 (0, 1), the responder valuates it by qv, where q 2 (0, 1) is exogenously given and commonly known. Thus, both valuations are perfectly correlated. Due to q < 1, successful bargaining, i.e., trade, is always welfare enhancing. The proposer offers a price p for the commodity to the responder who then either accepts or rejects the offer. Defining d(p) = 1(0) when the responder accepts (rejects) the offered price p, the gains from trade are d(p)(v À p) for P and d(p)(p À qv) for R. Total surplus amounts to d(p)(1 À q)v, where (1 À q)v is the size of the pie.
We distinguish two information settings, blindfolded ultimatum bargaining B (both players do not know the realization of the random variable v) and informed ultimatum bargaining I (both players are informed about v) and assume the random variable v -determining the size of the pie -to be uniformly distributed on the unit interval (0, 1) which is commonly known.
Scenario B -blindfolded ultimatum bargaining: proposer P and responder R are not informed about the realization of value v but about its mean of 1/2. The responder's expected payoff in case of d(p) = 1 is
Þonly if p ≥ q/2. The proposer expects the payoff Ep P ðpÞ ¼ 1=2 À p in case of trade. If the proposer is risk neutral as well, his optimal offer is p B = q/2. This implies a gain for the responder in case of v < 1/2, but a loss in case of v > 1/2. Given risk neutrality the commodity will be traded and the expected gains from trade for the proposer and the responder are Proposer P exploits ultimatum power and acquires the total expected surplus (1 À q)/2 from trade. As benchmark predictions we will therefore test Hypothesis 1a. In blindfolded ultimatum bargaining, the proposer offers price p B = q/2, and Hypothesis 1b. In blindfolded ultimatum bargaining, the responder only accepts price offers p B ≥ q/2.
The second scenario in our analysis maintains that v is randomly generated. However, the size of the pie is announced to proposer and responder before negotiation starts.
Scenario I -informed ultimatum bargaining: the realization of value v is commonly known when bargaining takes place.
Again, the proposer exploits ultimatum power by offering price p I = qv, which the responder accepts. The gains from trade p I P ¼ ð1 À qÞ=2 and p I R ¼ 0 coincide with the expected gains from trade in scenario B: the proposer receives the whole surplus from trade, (1 À q)/2, the payoff for the responder is 0. Our benchmark predictions for informed ultimatum bargaining are therefore Hypothesis 2a. In informed ultimatum bargaining, the proposer offers price p I (v) = qv and Hypothesis 2b. In informed ultimatum bargaining, the responder only accepts price offers p I (v) ≥ qv.
Comparative static effects of responder's valuation q and value v on price offers and acceptance thresholds are summarized in Hypothesis 3. In both scenarios, B and I, price offers and acceptance thresholds increase in q. In informed ultimatum bargaining (scenario I), price offers and acceptance thresholds increase (linearly) in v.
Both scenarios suggest that price offers are increasing in the level of q. In scenario I, value v determines the strength of the q-dependency: for v > 1/2, the price offered in scenario I increases more than in scenario B; for v ≤ 1/2, however, the price offered in scenario B increases more. In the latter case, the optimal offer in scenario B is therefore higher than the one in scenario I, whereas in the former case the optimal offer is higher in scenario I. The same applies to responders' acceptance thresholds.
Hypothesis 4. Becoming informed about v induces higher (lower) price offers and acceptance thresholds than in the blindfolded setting when v > 1/2 (v ≤ 1/2).
The expected surplus from trade is identical in both settings, irrespective of information about v. From a cognitive perspective, however, blindfolded ultimatum bargaining seems more complex: knowing v, participants do not have to cope with risk, and the surplus from trade is less ambiguous. Therefore, one should expect successful bargaining to be more likely when value v, determining the size of the pie, is common knowledge. Since we experimentally implement the transition from uninformed to informed participants, we can specifically compare whether information about the size of the pie induces successful bargaining as measured by the probability of acceptance d(p).
Hypothesis 5. Becoming informed about v increases the probability of successful ultimatum bargaining.
Given our experimental framing of eliciting price offers and acceptance thresholds, predictions regarding the effect of risk attitude on price offers and acceptance thresholds are somewhat complex. In their seminal contribution, Holt and Laury (2002) define risk aversion as participants' inclination to avoid negative expected payoffs. However, in our experimental setup of eliciting minimum selling and maximum buying prices, the impact of risk attitude is not straightforward. While proposers increase the probability of successful bargaining with higher price offers, such offers at the same time yield lower payoffs when bargaining is successful. Thus, risk attitude may induce countervailing effects which partly overlap with loss aversion. Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) point out that the elicitation of minimum selling prices induces a form of loss aversion which can lead risk-averse individuals to choose risk-neutral or risk-seeking (higher) acceptance thresholds. To disentangle both effects we distinguish the risk of (bargaining) failure from the risk of incurring losses: failure-risk-averse subjects aim at rendering bargaining successful, whereas loss-risk-averse subjects aim at avoiding negative payoffs. This distinction leads to the following hypotheses Hypothesis 6a. Failure-risk-averse subjects choose higher price offers and lower acceptance thresholds.
Blindfolded vs. Informed Ultimatum Bargaining
Hypothesis 6b. Loss-risk-averse subjects choose lower price offers and higher acceptance thresholds.
We expect these risk attitudes to affect behavior only in case of blindfolded ultimatum bargaining.
Hypothesis 6c. Failure(loss)-risk aversion leads to higher (lower) price offers and lower (higher) acceptance thresholds only in blindfolded ultimatum bargaining.
In light of the strong experimental evidence emphasizing the importance of behavioral motives in bargaining situations, we further propose that inequality aversion plays a substantial role: Responders reject 'too low' price offers and proposers offer 'fairer' prices. One can justify the latter effect either by proposers anticipating responders' inequality aversion or by own intrinsic inequality aversion of proposers (see, e.g., Ockenfels, 1998, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) . Strong fairness concerns induced by inequality aversion lead to equal sharing, e.g., equal expected payoffs of proposer and responder. Thus, inequality aversion could lead participants to rely on the task-independent 'equal sharing' strategy which would render all price offers leading to an unequal sharing of the pie as unfair. An alternative strategy could be to reduce cognitive effort by simply choosing the midpoint of all possible values (i.e., the 'golden mean'), similar to 'level-0' behavior in guessing games (see Nagel, 1995) . Either behavioral strategy could reflect an unwillingness to engage in more or less complex considerations regarding the experimental task(s). Additionally, in the case of blindfolded ultimatum bargaining such task-independent strategies could be a response to the lack of information as they provide guidance of what to choose. We therefore expect Hypothesis 7. Behavioral strategies such as 'equal sharing' as well as the 'golden mean' strategy are implemented more often in blindfolded than in informed ultimatum bargaining.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND SETUP
Ultimatum bargaining is framed as an 'acquiring-a-company' game: a potential buyer (proposer P) offers a price for a commodity owned by a potential seller (responder R), who chooses an acceptance threshold, i.e., we implemented the (monotonic) strategy method.
2 By asking responders for their acceptance thresholds instead of confronting them with only one specific proposer's price offer, we purposefully deviate from our theoretical model to gather more informative data. This procedure allows a more detailed analysis of responder behavior. Note, 2. In a survey of experimental comparisons between the strategy and direct-response method, Brandts and Charness (2011) report differences in experimental results only for four out of nineteen experimental comparisons. All treatment effects identified when using the strategy method were also observed when using the direct-response method.
however, that the sequential-move equilibrium evolves as one out of a continuum of possible equilibria in the experimentally implemented simultaneousmove game. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two roles and remained in that role. To study the transition from scenario B to scenario I in a within-subject design, we divided each session into two phases: In phase 1, participants played three rounds of scenario B, followed by three rounds of scenario I in phase 2. The instructions for the first phase were handed out at the beginning of a session, the instructions for the second phase only after phase 1 had ended.
Participants played six rounds altogether. In the three rounds of each phase, participants faced a random sequence of three different levels of q ¼ f0:35; 0:45; 0:55g. They were informed about the q-level prior to choosing their price offer (acceptance threshold) in both scenarios. In scenario B the value v was unknown to the participants. Consequently, throughout the experiment knowing v was equivalent to knowing the size of the pie. In scenario I P-and Rparticipants were successively confronted with 15 randomly drawn realizations of v 2 [0, 100] allowing us to observe how different pie sizes affect behavior. The realizations of v, including their order of appearance as well the order of the three q-levels, were randomly drawn before the experiment started and kept constant across all sessions.
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In phase 2, informed P-and R-participants stated a price offer, respectively, an acceptance threshold, in the range of 0 to 100 for every v value. P-participants stated the price at which they would buy the commodity (buyer price BP), R-participants stated the minimum price for which they would sell the commodity, i.e., their acceptance threshold (seller price SP). Whenever BP exceeded the seller's acceptance threshold SP, the commodity was traded at the offered price BP, i.e., d(BP) = 1, otherwise bargaining failed, d(BP) = 0. The resulting payoffs, d(BP) (v À BP) for the proposer and d(BP)(BP À qv) for the responder, were described formally as well as verbally in the instructions.
In scenario I, played in phase 2 of the experiment, informed participants made altogether 45 decisions, corresponding to the 15 v-realizations in each of the three rounds. In scenario B, played in phase 1 of the experiment, participants were not informed about v but q was commonly announced in every round. Participants therefore made only one choice per round: uninformed R-participants stated their acceptance threshold, uninformed P-participants chose a price offer.
There was no feedback between rounds. At the end of the experiment, we randomly matched each P-participant with an R-participant and chose one v-realization for each round as relevant for payment, i.e., participants were paid for altogether six decisions.
All sessions started with a set of control questions concerning decision tasks and payoffs. To emphasize that negative payoffs were possible, an appropriate example was included in the control questions. After all participants had answered these questions correctly, three trial rounds including feedback to participants took place to ensure that they understood the consequences of their decisions. After six rounds, participants were asked to fill out a postexperimental questionnaire.
Throughout the experiment, payoffs were calculated in Experimental Currency Units (ECU) and converted into euros at a given and known exchange rate (6 ECU = 1 euro). Besides a show-up fee of 5 euros, participants received their payoff earned according to six randomly drawn decisions (one from each of the six rounds) as well as the reward for a lottery question on risk tolerance (see Holt and Laury, 2002) in the postexperimental questionnaire. The experiment was programmed in z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) . We ran three sessions, two with 32 and one with 30 participants. Participants were students of Friedrich Schiller University Jena (Germany). On average, sessions lasted about 90 minutes, and payments to participants amounted, on average, to 16.32 euros and ranged from 6.60 to 55.40 euros.
When payoffs (exclusive of participation fees and rewards for the lottery questions) summed up to a negative value, participants could choose to either pay the debt out of their pocket or to work off the debt by completing an effort task (counting the letter 't' in a text). Of the 13 (13.8%) participants confronted with negative payoffs all chose to work instead of pay their debt. 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A first glimpse at our data suggests that blindfolded ultimatum bargaining leads to higher price offers and acceptance thresholds than bargaining with complete information. Figure 1 depicts univariate kernel density estimations for both treatments, distinguishing between proposers choosing a price offer and responders choosing acceptance thresholds.
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While we observe a single peak at the center of possible choices, 50, in case of blindfolded decisions, price offers and acceptance thresholds both decrease and show a larger variance when participants become informed. As we will investigate in more detail below, this is caused by informed participants who implement task-specific strategies more often and are therefore more sensitive to changes in parameter q. Figure 2 depicts kernel density estimations separately for the three different q-levels. These descriptive results indicate that q-levels play a substantial role. Take, e.g., the highest q-level 0.55: For informed and blindfolded ultimatum bargaining, the variance of price offers and acceptance thresholds increases relative to lower q-levels, where the effect is apparently larger for informed ultimatum bargaining.
4. For every correctly completed exercise, participants earned 5 euros. A negative payoff could not be compensated by the show-up fee or the reward for the lottery question in the postexperimental questionnaire. If participants chose to work long enough to earn a wage equivalent to the debt they had accumulated in the experiment, they received a positive payoff consisting solely of the show-up fee and the reward for the lottery question, i.e., participants could not increase their earnings with the extra effort task. 5. All presented kernel density estimations are carried out using the Epanechnikov kernel function with a bandwidth of 5. To test Hypotheses 1a and 1b, we investigate whether decisions in blindfolded ultimatum bargaining are close to the theoretical benchmark. 6 We conduct Wilcoxon-matched pairs signed-rank tests to compare (hypothetical) optimal choices to actual ones. We find price offers on a 1% significance level higher than the benchmark for all levels of q, i.e., Hypothesis 1a predicting optimal price offers in scenario B is rejected.
Regarding responder behavior, Hypothesis 1b predicts that only sufficiently high offers should be accepted. Proceeding as before, we use a Wilcoxonmatched pairs signed-rank test which shows that acceptance thresholds are significantly higher than the benchmark for all levels of q (p < 0.01). Thus, Hypothesis 1b is also rejected.
For all levels of q, the theoretical benchmark is not chosen frequently. The total frequency of near-optimal price offers and acceptance thresholds is 9 out of 87 in round 1 (corresponding to a share of 10.34%), 5 in round 2 (5.7%), and 7 in round 3 (8.0%). Potential behavioral explanations for the observed behavior might be 'equal sharing' and the 'golden mean'. Using expected payoffs, sharing equally requires price p e = (1 + q)25, whereas the 'golden mean' in our experimental setting is 50. Table 1 summarizes the respective predictions of equal sharing and golden mean together with the theoretical benchmark and the mean values of BP and SP in the experiment, distinguishing between the three possible (and throughout the experiment commonly known) levels of q.
Average choices in the blindfolded ultimatum game, BP and SP, lie between equal sharing and golden mean and -as reported above -exceed the theoretical benchmark solutions. Table 2 reports frequencies of the benchmark, equal sharing, and the golden mean strategy, allowing for a 10% deviation from the values reported in Table 1 .
Regarding Hypothesis 3, we estimate the impact of parameter q on price offers and acceptance thresholds. As q-levels were varied within subjects, we control for 6. We do so by relying on generic predictions related to e-equilibria (see Radner (1980) tolerating deviations from benchmark payoffs yielding e less than predicted by optimality. For an illustration, consider the benchmark solution for round 1 where q = 0.55. The optimal price offer would be p* = 27.5, yielding a payoff of 22.5 for P. A 10% variation allows payoff reductions up to 2.25. This is fulfilled for 25.25 ≤ p e ≤ 29.75. As participants could only choose integer values, we considered the span from 25 up to 30 as being (nearly) optimal.
unobserved time-constant characteristics of individual subjects by estimating a linear fixed effects model. Results are reported in Table 3 .
Estimation results indicate that the q-level has a significantly positive effect only on acceptance thresholds SP, whereas there is no significant correlation between q and price offers BP. Recall that the (ex post) gains from bargaining are v À BP for the proposer and BP À qv for the responder. The result that only responder decisions are affected by different q-levels suggests that participants base their decisions mainly on their own payoffs: responders increase acceptance thresholds with q-levels to ensure a positive payoff, whereas proposers' choicesgiven that their (ex post) payoffs do not directly depend on q -are not significantly affected by changes in q. Most proposer-participants apparently neglect how q affects the strategy of their bargaining partner and do not account for the fact that responders increase acceptance thresholds in response to higher q-levels. In summary, this suggests Result 1. In blindfolded ultimatum bargaining, proposer and responder behavior deviates from the benchmark in that proposers offer higher than optimal prices and responders choose higher than optimal acceptance thresholds. While -as predicted -acceptance thresholds increase in q-levels, price offers are not significantly affected by q.
Regarding risk attitude, Hypotheses 6a and 6b predict how failure-risk aversion and loss-risk aversion affect choices, where Hypothesis 6c proposes that risk attitude affects behavior only in blindfolded ultimatum bargaining. To test whether subjects' (constant) risk attitudes significantly affect price offers and acceptance thresholds, we estimate an ordinary least squares (OLS) model, clustering standard errors at the subject level. We measure risk attitude using the postexperimental lottery question wherein our instrumentalization of risk aversion follows Holt and Laury (2002) . To simplify the analysis of possible interaction effects of risk aversion with the participants' role (proposer or responder) and with responders' valuation q, we construct a dummy variable RISK, taking unit value if participants are risk averse, i.e., if they chose a relatively 'safer' option more often than a risk neutral subject would have. 7 We further include the dummy variable PROP, taking unit value when a participant is in the role of a proposer and zero value when a participant is in the role of a responder. This allows us to investigate the distinct effect of risk attitude on proposers and responders. When analyzing the joint effect of responders' valuation and risk aversion (RISK 9 PROP) we use q = 0.35 as reference category. Finally, we control for gender effects by including the dummy variable FEMALE. Table 4 reports our results.
Regression model I in Table 4 suggests that risk aversion does not affect behavior in blindfolded ultimatum bargaining. However, including interaction effects of risk aversion and being a proposer, as well as risk aversion and the different qlevels in regression model II, we find a significantly negative effect for the RISK dummy but significantly positive effects for the interaction with high q-levels. While being a proposer, PROP, generally leads to a significantly lower choice, the insignificant effect of interaction term RISK 9 PROP indicates that there is no rolespecific effect of risk attitude. The overall negative effect of risk attitude suggests that responders' choices are driven by 'failure-risk aversion' leading them to choose lower acceptance thresholds whereas proposers' choices are driven by 'lossrisk aversion' leading them to choose lower price offers. However, the positive effect of interaction terms RISK 9 q = 0.45 and RISK 9 q = 0.55 suggests that for Note: Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%. Standard errors clustered at subject level.
7. Given the setup of Holt and Laury (2002) , this is the case if the safe option is chosen in more than four out of ten possible choices. We observed non-monotonic risk preferences for seven out of our 94 participants and dropped these observations. high stakes these effects are reversed. In this case 'failure-risk aversion' prevails for proposers leading them to choose higher price offers, whereas 'loss-risk aversion' prevails for responders leading them to choose higher acceptance thresholds. In summary this supports Hypotheses 6a and 6b stating how risk attitude affects decisions in blindfolded ultimatum bargaining. Generally, risk aversion leads to lower prices, whereas high responder valuations q induce a positive effect: If stakes are high, responders want to make sure that they gain from selling whereas proposers try to assure that bargaining is successful. We state Result 2. In blindfolded ultimatum bargaining, risk aversion leads to lower price offers and acceptance thresholds, with the effect being reversed if responders' valuation parameter q is high.
Bargaining for a known surplus from trade: Scenario I
In scenario I, proposer and responder are able to condition their decisions on value v. To investigate Hypothesis 2a, predicting exploitative price offers in scenario I, we check whether actual and predicted choices are significantly different from each other. To this end, we calculate standard deviations between actual and optimal choices at the subject level, using the average of the different choices made for each of the 15 randomly selected v-values. In a next step, we compare these standard deviations to the theoretically predicted deviations, namely zero, using Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. For both, proposers and responders, deviations from the benchmark are significant at the 1% level, thus rejecting Hypothesis 2a and Hypothesis 2b.
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Result 3. In informed ultimatum bargaining, proposer and responder behavior deviates from the theoretical benchmark in that proposers offer higher than optimal prices and responders set higher than optimal acceptance thresholds. Table 5 summarizes the mean values of BP and SP in the informed ultimatum game (scenario I). Average choices lie between the theoretical benchmark and equal sharing. 8. Proceeding similarly to scenario B conducting Wilcoxon matched-pair signed-rank tests to compare (hypothetical) optimal choices to actual ones, we find price offers as well as acceptance thresholds are on a 1% significance level higher than the benchmark for all levels of q.
Blindfolded vs. Informed Ultimatum Bargaining
In Table 6 we report frequencies of the benchmark, equal sharing, and the golden mean strategy, allowing for a 10% deviation from the values reported in Table 1 .
Experiments implementing the ultimatum game are known to be an especially difficult environment to learn subgame perfection (see Andreoni and Blanchard, 2006) . In our experiment, we observe the frequency with which the benchmark strategy is chosen in the informed ultimatum game to increase to 20.8% in the final round. Since we held the order of v values and q-levels constant across sessions (0.45 in round 1, 0.55 in round 2, and 0.35 in round 3 of scenario I), we cannot exclude that this increase could be caused by learning. However, earlier experimental evidence (see e.g., Andreoni and Blanchard, 2006; Nowak et al., 2000) suggests that ultimatum bargaining converges towards the equal split rather than towards the theoretical prediction over the course of successive rounds. We therefore conjecture that our results are most likely not driven by learning effects.
Hypothesis 3 predicts price offers and acceptance thresholds to increase in q and v in scenario I. We estimate a linear fixed effects model and report our results in Table 7 .
Estimation results strongly support Hypothesis 3: Both, q and v, have a significantly positive effect on price offers and acceptance thresholds in scenario I. These results indicate that -unlike in blindfolded ultimatum bargaining -proposers anticipate how responders' payoffs are affected by v values and therefore adjust their price offers accordingly.
Supplementing this with our findings for scenario B, we state Result 4. In informed ultimatum bargaining, an increase of the q-level as well as an increase of value v has a significantly positive effect on price offers and acceptance thresholds. In blindfolded ultimatum bargaining, an increase of the q-level has a significantly positive effect on acceptance thresholds only.
Regarding risk aversion, Hypothesis 6c predicts that, since participants are informed about the pie size via v, risk aversion should not affect their decisions. Mirroring our earlier analysis, we estimate an OLS model, including the interaction terms discussed in section 4.1. Table 8 reports our results which confirm this prediction.
Complementing these findings with the reported results for blindfolded ultimatum bargaining, we find strong support for Hypothesis 6c and state In a first step, we investigate the impact of becoming informed about v on proposer and on responder behavior. To evaluate the effect of the within-subject 
transition from blindfolded to informed ultimatum bargaining, we estimate a linear fixed effects model including a dummy variable INFO taking unit value for informed ultimatum bargaining and zero value for blindfolded ultimatum bargaining as well as the q-level which varied throughout the six rounds of the experiment. Estimation results are reported in Table 9 . Estimation results in Table 9 report that q-levels have a significantly positive effect on price offers and acceptance thresholds, whereas becoming informed has a significantly negative effect. Hypothesis 4 predicts that this effect is contingent on value v: becoming informed about v induces higher price offers and acceptance thresholds whenever v > 50, whereas for v ≤ 50, becoming informed induces lower price offers and acceptance thresholds. To investigate this relationship empirically, we reestimate the fixed effects model for observations with v ≤ 50 (Table 10 , column 1) and v > 50 (Table 10 , column 2) separately. As the effect of becoming informed is identically negative for proposers and responders (see Table 9 ), we report results jointly, i.e., the dependent variable in our estimations is participants' choice level (price offer or acceptance threshold).
9 Table 9 Effect of becoming informed on price offers and acceptance thresholds (fixed effects) Note: Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%. Robust standard errors.
9. Reported results are robust to estimating the fixed effects model for proposers and responders separately.
As predicted, informed proposers (responders) choose lower price offers (acceptance thresholds) whenever the value v -reflecting the size of the pie -is low, whereas they choose higher price offers (acceptance thresholds) for high values of v. These findings support Hypothesis 4 and we state Result 6. Becoming informed about the size of the pie reduces price offers and acceptance thresholds in the case of low values (v ≤ 50) and increases price offers and acceptance thresholds in the case of high values (v > 50).
In fact, the separation of our decision data for high vs. low values of v reveals a differing effect of the q-level: If v is small, increasing q leads to a significant reduction in price offers and acceptance thresholds, whereas the predicted positive effect of q on price offers and acceptance thresholds (see Hypothesis 3) prevails only if v is high. This suggests that proposers choose lower price offers for small v to assure positive gains from trade, whereas responders -anticipating this behavior -choose lower acceptance thresholds to assure that bargaining is successful.
Hypothesis 5 predicts that blindfolded ultimatum bargaining leads to less successful bargaining because in this scenario price offers are below acceptance thresholds more often. To investigate the effect of becoming informed on the probability that trade will take place we use actually matched pairs of proposers and responders and estimate a probit model. 10 As participants are informed about q in both scenarios, we include the q-level to test whether it has a significant impact on the probability of successful bargaining. To test whether risk attitude affects the probability of trade, we further include the dummy variable for individual risk aversion (RISK) in the estimation. Table 11 reports the estimation results.
As proposed by Hypothesis 5, the probability of trade is affected by participants becoming informed: if proposers and responders know value v, the 75.708 *** Note: Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%. Standard errors clustered at subject level.
10. As we dropped observations with non-monotonic risk preferences, only one participant out of a successful pair could remain in our data. This is the reason why more price offers (N = 1,195) than acceptance thresholds (N = 1,342) led to successful bargaining. We control for this imbalance by including the role dummy PROP.
probability of successful bargaining is significantly higher than in blindfolded ultimatum bargaining.
Result 7. Becoming informed about v increases the probability of successful bargaining.
Responders' valuation parameter q, however, has no effect on the probability of successful bargaining. This mirrors our earlier results that price offers and acceptance thresholds (mostly) increase with responders' valuation. As long as this relationship is proportional, the probability of trade remains unaffected.
Concerning risk attitude we find an overall negative effect of risk aversion on the probability of successful bargaining. However, the interaction term RISK 9 PROP is significantly positive meaning that the effect of risk aversion is role dependent. While risk-averse proposers have a significantly higher probability for successful bargaining, risk averse responders have a significantly lower probability. Recall from Hypothesis 6a that 'failure-risk aversion' leads proposers to choose higher price offers. The observed significantly higher probability of successful bargaining for proposers is caused by their higher price offers meaning that 'failure-risk aversion' drives proposers' decisions. Recall from Hypothesis 6b that 'loss-risk aversion' leads responders to choose higher acceptance thresholds. The observed significantly lower probability of successful bargaining for responders is caused by their higher acceptance thresholds meaning that 'loss-risk aversion' drives responders' decisions. We summarize these findings in Result 8. Risk aversion has a significantly positive effect on the probability of successful bargaining, i.e., failure-risk aversion overcompensates loss-risk aversion.
Supplementing this with our finding that risk attitude has an insignificant effect in scenario I (where proposers and responders are informed about the size of the pie), there is no doubt that information about the pie size is crucial for the probability of successful ultimatum bargaining: While becoming informed directly increases the probability of successful bargaining it additionally offsets the negative impact of risk aversion on the probability of successfully bargaining.
Comparing the frequencies at which participants choose the 'benchmark', 'equal sharing' or 'golden mean' strategies (see Tables 2 and 6 ), the frequency of e-optimal choices seems to increase when becoming informed, whereas the behavioral strategies 'equal sharing' and 'golden mean' are implemented less often when the size of the pie is known. This latter observation supports Hypothesis 7. To substantiate these descriptive findings we investigate the effect of becoming informed on the use of the three strategies: We implement a dummy variable for each strategy, taking unit value whenever a chosen price offer or acceptance threshold lies within a 10%-range of the strategy-specific predicted values. Estimation results of the respective probit estimations are reported in Tables 12-14. As proposed by our descriptive results, becoming informed has a significantly positive effect on the use of the benchmark strategy, but only for a low q-level (q = 0.35). The significant effect of the role dummy (PROP) for q = 0.55 offers a possible explanation for this restriction: Responders trying to avoid negative payoffs choose higher acceptance thresholds in reaction to high q-levels -countervailing the information-induced move toward (lower) e-optimal price offers and acceptance thresholds. Furthermore, we find that becoming informed reduces the use of the equal sharing strategy.
11 Lastly, the golden mean strategy 11. The coefficient of the INFO dummy is highly significant for the highest and q-lowest levels, but insignificant for q = 0.45 (p = 0.106).
is used significantly less often, as proposed. These findings support Hypothesis 7 and suggest that information about the size of the pie induces participants to focus attention on the experimental task rather than to rely on task-independent behavioral strategies such as the golden mean or equal sharing. We state Result 9. Becoming informed about the size of the pie decreases the use of the task-independent behavioral strategies 'equal sharing' and 'golden mean'.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Our analysis of how information affects ultimatum bargaining for a random pie suggests one main finding, namely that proposer and responder behavior significantly depends on their information. Experimental results significantly differ between blindfolded (both parties are uninformed) and informed (both parties are informed) ultimatum bargaining. The transition from the first to the second scenario reflects an important institutional change, e.g., when industries mature and the values of the established firms become commonly known. Our findings add new insights to the role of information in ultimatum bargaining: informed participants use the available information to make task-dependent decisions as suggested by the relatively higher use of (nearly) optimal choices whereas uninformed participants more often implement task-independent strategies such as equal sharing or the golden mean. Participants' risk attitude significantly influences behavior only in blindfolded ultimatum bargaining whereas becoming informed renders its effect insignificant.
When blindfolded, proposers and responders are more cautious, choosing higher price offers and acceptance thresholds. While this suggests that proposers try to ensure successful bargaining, such behavior could also be driven by proposers' anticipation of the cautious and therefore higher acceptance thresholds of responders trying to limit the risk of negative payoffs. Becoming informed decreases price offers and acceptance thresholds, whereas the frequency of successful bargaining increases. Furthermore, while uninformed choices of proposers and responders are adjusted to responders' valuation of the pie, blindfolded choices are adjusted only by responders, even though valuations are common knowledge. The latter finding could be explained by loss averse subjects. Including loss aversion in their expected utilities, highly loss averse responders could increase their acceptance thresholds in order to avoid losses. Loss averse proposers, however, anticipating higher responder thresholds, rather leave their price offers unchanged because higher price offers would decrease expected payoffs without substantially decreasing loss probabilities, while decreasing price offers would increase loss probability.
12
Risk attitude, as expected, affects behavior only in blindfolded ultimatum bargaining where its effect depends on responders' valuation. Overall, risk aversion decreases the probability of successful bargaining. This suggests that risk averse 12. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the potential role of loss aversion in explaining our results.
proposers and responders mainly try to reduce the risk of negative payoffs rather than the risk of unsuccessful bargaining. Much of the ultimatum game literature is dedicated to the analysis of otherregarding concerns for reward allocation between proposer and responder. Especially fairness concerns are identified as having substantial implications (see e.g. Hoffman et al., 1996) . We contribute to this literature by pointing out that information about the pie size affects the impact of fairness concerns. For blindfolded bargaining, the partner's fairness concerns are even more pronounced, as participants -for lack of other orientation -quite often share expected payoffs equally.
In settings with asymmetric information where either the proposer or the responder is informed about the pie size, the uninformed participant is unaware of what their bargaining partner receives. Becoming informed then induces more equal sharing of the pie than with one-sided information, i.e., price offers and acceptance thresholds increase (see e.g. Croson, 1996) . At first sight this seems to contradict our finding that equal sharing is used less when becoming informed. However, one has to keep in mind that we assume both, proposer and responder (rather than only one of them), to be uninformed before becoming informed. That is, neither player can exploit superior information in the uninformed setting, whereas with asymmetric information the better informed can choose an unequal offer without this being noticed by his bargaining partner. Thus, while one participant gains from his superior information at the expense of his bargaining partner in the asymmetric setting, this is no longer possible if ultimatum bargaining is blindfolded.
APPENDIX A EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS

A.1. GENERAL INFORMATION
Thank you for participating in this experiment. Please remain silent and turn off your mobile phones. Please read the instructions carefully and note that they are identical for each participant. From now on, you may not talk to other participants. In case you do not follow these rules, we will have to exclude you from the experiment as well as from any payment. You will receive 5 euros for participating in this experiment. The participation fee and any additional amount of money you will earn during the experiment will be paid out to you in cash at the end of the session. All participants will be paid individually, i.e., no other participant will know how much you earned. All monetary amounts in the experiment will be paid in ECU (experimental currency units). At the end, all earned ECUs will be converted into euros using the following exchange rate:
Blindfolded vs. Informed Ultimatum Bargaining
A.2. PROCEDURE
The experiment consists of the following parts: control questions, six rounds divided into two stages, and a final questionnaire. Before starting the first stage, three practice rounds will be held. After completing stage 1, you will receive the instructions for the second stage. At the beginning of the experiment, each participant is randomly assigned one out of two possible roles. One half of the participants will be assigned the role of a buyer, B; the other half will be assigned the role of a seller, S. You will remain in the role you have been assigned throughout the experiment, i.e., in stage 1 and stage 2.
At the end of the experiment, for each of the six rounds, one of your decisions is selected to determine your payment, i.e., one decision per round. If you suffer a loss in the six selected decisions, you can pay for it in cash or balance it by completing additional tasks at the end of the experiment. Please note that these tasks can only be used to compensate for possible losses, but not to increase your earnings. Additionally, you will receive a payment for one task from the questionnaire part. Hence, you will receive the participation fee and payment for the questionnaire part in any case.
A.3. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE EXPERIMENT
The experiment consists of two stages, each consisting of three rounds.
The procedure of a round in stage 1 is structured as follows:
1 The computer randomly selects 15 values of v between 0 and incl. 100 (v = 0, 1, . . ., 100). In this case, each value v between 0 and 100 can be selected with equal probability. 2 Decisions of the participants.
The participant in role B chooses a buying price BP between 0 and incl. 100 (0 ≤ BP ≤ 100).
The participant in role S chooses a minimum selling price SP between 0 and incl. 100 (0 ≤ SP ≤ 100).
In each of the three rounds of stage 1, the randomly selected value of v is not announced to the participants. The uninformed participants only make one decision per round: participants in role S decide to which minimum selling price SP they would be willing to sell, and the participants in role B determine the buying price BP at which they would be willing to buy.
If the buying price BP offered by B is less than the minimum selling price SP offered by seller S, no sale takes place and no gains from the trade are generated, i.e., the earnings of S and B are 0.
If the buying price BP offered by B is higher than or equal to the minimum selling price SP, seller S accepts the bid made by buyer B, and the following earnings result from these choices:
The buyer receives the random value v minus the offered buying price BP. The seller receives the buying price BP proposed by B minus a share in the amount of x% of the random value v.
The amount of x% varies in the three rounds of a stage and can either correspond to 35%, 45%, or 55%, while the sequence of these three x-values is determined randomly.
Therefore, the earnings in the event of a trade can be summarized as follows:
B receivesðv À BPÞ;
S receivesðBP À x%vÞ;
where x% may correspond to either 35%, 45%, or 55%. Please note that profits from the sale are only positive for both participantsbuyer B and seller S -if the randomly selected value v is higher than buying price BP and this, in turn, is higher than x% v (v > BP > x%v).
If v is less than BP, buyer B receives a negative payoff due to the purchase. If BP is less than x% v, seller S receives a negative payoff due to the sale.
Therefore, seller S owns a good that has value v for buyer B but is less valuable for the latter, namely x% of value v. Depending on buying price BP, on x%, and on value v, it can be advantageous for S to sell to B.
You will receive the instructions for stage 2 at the end of stage 1. Before stage 1 of the experiment begins, we will ask you to answer a few control questions to help you better understand the rules of the experiment. This will be followed by practice rounds to become familiar with the structure of the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand.
A.4. INSTRUCTIONS FOR STAGE 2
In each of the three rounds of stage 2, both participants (in role S and B) are confronted with 15 values of v randomly drawn by the computer. Participants in role B decide on a buying price BP for each of the 15 values of v1, v2, . . ., v15, and participants in role S choose a minimum selling price SP for each of the 15 values. At the end of the experiment, one of these values v is randomly selected for each round and then used to determine the earnings of sellers S and buyers B as in stage 1. The difference to stage 1 consists only in the fact that you make your decisions knowing the 15 different values of v in each of the three roundsinstead of not knowing the value of v.
APPENDIX B. RANDOM ORDER OF V VALUES AND Q-LEVELS
Random order of q-levels in phase 1 (blindfolded ultimatum bargaining) Blindfolded vs. Informed Ultimatum Bargaining
